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The current work tested the hypothesis that a glucose drink would reduce worldview defense following 
mortality salience. Participants consumed either a glucose drink or placebo, wrote about either death or 
dental pain, and then completed a measure of worldview defense (viewing positively someone with 
pro-US views and viewing negatively someone with anti-US views). Mortality salience increased world- 
view defense among participants who consumed a placebo but not among participants who consumed a 
glucose drink. Glucose might reduce defensiveness after mortality salience by increasing the effectiveness 
of the self-controlled suppression of death-related thought, by providing resources to cope with mortality 
salience and reducing its threatening nature, or by distancing the individual from actual physical death. 
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Introduction 
Reminders of mortality are commonplace, yet people often 
avoid thinking about death because thoughts of dying can be 
personally threatening (e.g., Aries, 1981; Becker, 1973). The 
threatening nature of mortality triggers defensive reactions that 
function to reduce awareness of death (e.g., Florian & Miku- 
lincer, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1990; Heine, Harihara, & Niiya, 
2002; Landau et al., 2004; Ochsmann & Mathey, 1994). The 
current work focused on the biology of responses to death re- 
minders. It is posited that avoiding thoughts of death is de- 
manding, psychological work that requires additional metabolic 
energy. When metabolic energy is low, death should be more 
threatening. The prediction therefore was that lower glucose— 
the primary energy for the brain—would increase defensive 
responding to mortality reminders. 
There are at least three reasons why low glucose should be 
linked with increased defensiveness after mortality salience. 
One is that low glucose might impair the effortful, controlled 
suppression of death thoughts and thus increase defensive reac- 
tions to death reminders. Thoughts of death are avoided and 
suppressed (e.g., Aries, 1981; Becker, 1973; Feifel & Brans- 
comb, 1973; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & 
Breus, 1994; Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, & McGregor, 1997; Pollak, 1979, 1980). The avoid- 
ance or suppression of death thoughts is effortful and demand- 
ing (Arndt et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001), and requires 
controlled or executive processes (Greenberg et al., 1994; 
Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solo-
mon, 1999; Wegner, 1994). For instance, after thinking about 
mortality, death thoughts are suppressed and less accessible to 
awareness (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & 
Simon, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1994; Harmon-Jones et al., 
1997). Factors that impair controlled or executive processing 
(e.g., a cognitive load) undermine such suppression, however, 
and increase the accessibility of death thoughts (Arndt et al., 
1997; Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,  
2001; Smart & Wegner, 1999; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; Wen-
zlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
In particular, thought suppression requires self-control (e.g., 
Baumeister, Tice, & Heatherton, 1994; Wegner, 1994). Thus, 
people with good (v. poor) trait self-control appear less suscep- 
tible to thinking about death (Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Bau-
meister, 2006). Ample evidence indicates that exerting self- 
control impairs subsequent self-control (for reviews, see Bau- 
meister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; 
Gailliot, 2009). Consistent with these findings, suppressing 
thoughts impairs subsequent self-control (e.g., Gordijn, Hin- 
driks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2004; Mu- 
raven et al., 1998), as does mortality salience. Mortality Sali- 
ence has been found to impair performance on tasks requiring 
self-control, such as the Stroop task, solving anagrams, and 
effortful persistence tasks (Gailliot et al., 2006; Gailliot et al., 
2007). The idea is that, after thinking about death, people use 
self-control to suppress thought related to death, and this im-
pairs subsequent self-control. One study found that regulating 
emotions increased death thoughts among participants with 
poor trait self-control but not among participants with good trait 
self-control (Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Maner, 2007). Regulating 
emotions weakened self-control, thereby increasing the acces-
sibility of death-related thought, except among people with 
dispositionally good self-control. These findings indicate that 
self-control allows for the suppression of death related thought. 
Self-control, controlled processing, and effortful exertion use 
a relatively large amount of glucose, are better with optimal 
glucose levels in the bloodstream, and are impaired by low 
glucose or other metabolic problems (DeWall, Baumeister, 
Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; Fairclough & Houston, 2004; Gailliot, 
2008; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007; Gailliot et al., 2007; Gail- 
liot, Peruche, Plant, & Baumeister, 2009; Masicampo & Bau- 
meister, 2008). This indicates that the suppression of death- 
related thought after mortality salience is improved by glucose 
and impaired by low glucose or metabolic problems. Consistent 
with this rationale, mortality salience impaired self-control (i.e., 
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it reduced persistence at solving word fragments) in one study 
among participants who had consumed a placebo but not a glu- 
cose drink (Gailliot et al., 2007). The glucose drink presumably 
provided metabolic energy for self-control that had been de- 
pleted by suppressing thoughts of death. A few studies suggest 
that mortality salience might increase attempts to increase one’s 
metabolic energy, such as increasing the desire to buy food and 
to increase eating (Friese & Hofmann, 2008; Mandel & Smeest- 
ers, 2008; cf. Goldenberg, Arndt, Hart, & Brown, 2005). Per- 
haps mortality salience increases rating because people seek 
energy that can be used to avoid thinking about death. 
Effortful thought suppression reduces the implicit and ex- 
plicit accessibility of suppressed thoughts (Anderson & Green, 
2001; Arndt et al., 1997; MacLeod, 1989; McBride & Dosher, 
1997; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Individuals with optimal glu- 
cose levels therefore should be more successful in suppressing 
death thoughts. When mortality is salient, people respond de- 
fensively by increasing support for their worldviews, such as by 
reacting more positively toward people who support their cul- 
tural norms and values and more negatively toward those who 
disagree with their cultural norms and values (e.g., Florian & 
Mikulincer, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1990; Heine, Harihara, & 
Niiya, 2002; Landau et al., 2004; Ochsmann & Mathey, 1994). 
Because glucose might enable more effective suppression of 
death thoughts and reduce their accessibility, then it should 
reduce defensive reactions to mortality salience. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, consuming food (v. eating nothing) re- 
duced worldview defense caused by mortality salience, in the 
form of less negative judgments of worldview transgressions 
(Hirschberger & Ein-Dor, 2005). The food provided glucose 
that may have enabled more effective suppression of death- 
related thought and consequently less worldview defense. 
A second reason that glucose should influence worldview 
defense following mortality salience is derived from research 
on personal threat. Perceptions of threat tend to occur when the 
demands of the threat exceed resources available to cope 
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Blascovich & Mendes, 2000). 
Glucose is one resource used to cope with (i.e., suppress or 
avoid) thoughts of death. When it is low, death reminders 
should be more threatening. Defensive reactions therefore 
should be stronger. It is possible that mortality salience might 
increase eating (Friese & Hofmann, 2008; Mandel & Smeesters, 
2008) partly because individuals seek metabolic resources (e.g., 
glucose) to cope with the threat of death. 
The third reason that glucose should reduce defensive reac- 
tions to death reminders is that glucose is one substrate that 
determines both the physical and psychological threat of death. 
When glucose is low, physical death is more likely (e.g., from 
starvation, a weakened immune system, or a reduced capacity 
for energy demanding thought and behavior that aids in sur- 
vival) and death is more threatening psychologically, as the 
individual should be less able to cope. Death reminders there- 
fore should be more threatening both physically and psycho- 
logically when glucose is low, thereby leading to stronger de- 
fensive reactions. 
Thus, defensive reactions to mortality salience should be re- 
duced with additional glucose. Glucose might enable more 
effective suppression of death-thoughts and/or reduce the extent 
to which death is perceived as physically or psychologically 
threatening. To test this hypothesis, participants wrote about 
either death or a control topic, consumed a glucose drink or 
placebo, and then completed a measure of worldview defense. 
The prediction was that mortality salience would increase 
worldview defense but that this effect would be attenuated 
among participants who consumed a glucose drink. 
Method 
Participants 
The final sample included 93 college undergraduates (73 
women, 20 men) who participated in exchange for extra credit 
toward a course grade. Excluded from this sample were 8 par- 
ticipants who failed to complete the required experimental ma- 
terials and 13 participants who failed to drink the assigned bev- 
erage. The dependent measure of worldview defense pertained 
to American values and attitudes toward foreigners, and so 19 
participants of non-US (foreign) ethnic cities were excluded 
from the final sample. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants first consumed 14 ounces of lemonade sweet- 
ened with either sugar (glucose condition) or a sugar substitute 
(placebo condition). The glucose drink contained approxi-
mately 140 calories, whereas the placebo contained 0 calories. 
Participants and the experimenter were blind to condition. 
Next, participants wrote about either death or a control topic 
(dental pain). Participants in the mortality salience condition 
were asked to describe the emotions, the thought of their own 
death aroused in them and to write about what would happen to 
their bodies as they physically die (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Participants in the den- 
tal pain condition answered the same questions except they 
were about dental pain rather than death. 
The effects of the mortality salience manipulation used typi- 
cally emerge only after a short delay or distraction (Pyszczyn- 
ski et al., 1999). To provide this delay and distraction, and to 
allow sufficient time for the glucose (if any) in the drinks to be 
metabolized, participants completed measures of liking and 
taste for the drinks and a measure of mood and arousal. Spe- 
cifically, they indicated the extent to which the drink tasted 
good, sweet, bitter, and salty, had good texture and appearance, 
was difficult to drink, was pleasant to drink, and how much 
they liked the drink. They then completed the Brief Mood In- 
trospection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). The BMIS 
contains 20 items indicative of mood (e.g., happy, sad) and 
arousal (e.g., peppy, drowsy). Participants rated each item to 
indicate how they were feeling at the present moment, using a 
scale from 1 (definitely do not feel) to 7 (definitely feel). 
Last, participants completed a measure of worldview defense. 
Specifically, participants read two handwritten essays about the 
United States that were ostensibly written by two foreigners 
(borrowed from Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & 
Chatel, 1992). The order of the two essays was counterbalanced 
across participants. One essay was pro-US and praised Ameri-
cans, whereas the other essay was anti-US and criticized 
Americans. Participants evaluated the truth and validity of the 
essay and the likeability, intelligence, and knowledge ability of 
each essay’s author on 9-point scales. The summed evaluations 
of each essay served as the measures of favorability toward 
worldview-consistent and worldview-inconsistent opinions, re- 
spectively. In accord with past research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 
1994), worldview defense was defined as the difference be- 
tween these two measures. Larger differences indicate more 
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pronounced worldview defense. 
Results 
A 2 (Drink condition: Glucose drink vs. placebo) × 2 (Essay 
condition: Mortality salience vs. dental pain) analysis of vari- 
ance (ANOVA) on worldview defense scores indicated a sig- 
nificant interaction, F(1,89) = 4.04, p < .05. See Figure 1 for 
means. Tests of simple effects indicated that mortality salience, 
compared to dental pain salience, increased worldview defense 
in the placebo condition, F(1,42) = 4.23, p < .05, but not in the 
glucose-drink condition, F < 1, ns. Thus, mortality salience did 
not increase worldview defense among participants who con-
sumed a glucose drink. 
Analyses indicated that these results were not attributable to 
differences in taste, appearance, or likeability between the two 
drinks or to mood or arousal. Specifically, separate 2 (Drink 
condition: Glucose drink vs. placebo) × 2 (Essay condition: 
Mortality salience vs. dental pain) ANOVAs on taste, sweet- 
ness, bitterness, saltiness, texture, appearance, pleasantness, and 
likeability of the drink, as well as on how difficult the drink 
was to consume and on mood indicated no significant interac- 
tions, Fs < 2.03, ps > .15. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on arousal indi- 
cated a marginally significant interaction, F = 3.26, p = .07, 
suggesting the highest arousal among participants in the pla- 
cebo condition who wrote about death. The 2-way interaction 
between drink and essay conditions on worldview defense re- 
mained marginally significant when controlling for arousal, F = 
3.20, p = .08, however, indicating that the effects were not 
driven by arousal. 
Discussion 
Consistent with past work, the current study found that mor- 
tality salience increased worldview defense. This effect oc- 
curred only among participants who consumed a placebo, 
however, and not among participants who consumed a glucose 
drink. The rationale was that glucose would reduce worldview 
defense because it allows for more effective suppression of 
death-related thought via self-control, is a resource used to cope 
with death (thus the threatening nature of mortality salience 
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Figure 1. 
Worldview defense as a function of essay and drink conditions. 
should be reduced), and/or is a signal that death is more threat- 
ening physically and thus psychologically. Glucose reduces 
defensive reactions to mortality salience, whereas low glucose 
predisposes individuals to increased defensiveness after mortal-
ity salience. 
Past work has shown that mortality salience has a cognitive 
cost. It activated controlled suppression mechanisms that impair 
self-control afterwards (Gailliot et al., 2006; Gailliot et al., 
2007). The current work suggests that mortality salience might 
also have metabolic costs. Suppressing thoughts of death could 
plausibly reduce glucose faster than it is replenished. 
Another implication is that glucose can be used as an aid to 
help people cope with death or suppress or avoid death-related 
thought. Rather than respond defensively, which can often en- 
tail derogating others, a glucose drink might quell at least some 
of the potential terror elicited by thoughts of death. Metabolic 
problems aside from low glucose (e.g., hunger, malnourishment) 
might also moderate defensive reactions to death. 
Diabetes and glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency, 
two metabolic disorders, have been linked with reduced aggres- 
sive restraint (DeWall, Gailliot, Deckman, & Bushman, 2009), 
one form of self-control, suggesting that these disorders might 
relate to reactions to mortality salience as well. 
The amount of metabolic energy that can be used during a 
given amount of time is limited (Klieber, 1961). A large body 
of evidence demonstrates that energy used by one process 
therefore can be diverted away from others (Gailliot, Hilde- 
brandt, Eckel, & Baumeister, 2009). Hence, processes that in- 
fluence glucose (e.g., immune defense, biological reproductive 
activity, stress) could also influence defensive responding to 
mortality salience. Cancer cells, for instance, use a dispropor- 
tionately large amount of glucose (Schoen et al., 1999; Weber 
et al., 2003; Younes, Lechago, Somoano, Mosharaf, & Lechago, 
1996). Some evidence suggests that their metabolic-energy use 
might divert energy away from and thereby impair frontal lobe 
functioning (Cleeland et al., 2003; Meyers, Albitar, & Estey, 
2005; Meyers, Byrne, & Komaki, 1995). Individuals with can- 
cer therefore might especially struggle to avoid thinking about 
death or engaging indefensive responses not only because of 
their potentially terminal condition but also because the cancer 
cells might divert metabolic energy away from the suppression 
of death-related thought or contribute to low glucose levels that 
predispose toward heightened defensiveness. Metabolic activity 
increases in the ovaries during premenstrual syndrome, and 
these increases appear to divert energy from and impair self- 
control (Gailliot et al., 2009). Women therefore might be espe- 
cially likely to engage in defensive responding to mortality 
salience while experiencing premenstrual syndrome symptoms. 
Evidence indicates that the psychological capacity for some 
processes operates through the existence of earlier, biological 
systems (e.g., morality and disgust, Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; 
emotional and physical pain, DeWall & Baumeister, 2006; 
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & 
Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Processes enact- 
ing self-control rely heavily on glucose levels (e.g., Gailliot & 
Baumeister, 2007; Gailliot et al., 2007). If metabolite levels are 
indicative of survival capacity, with low glucose indicating a 
greater threat of death (e.g., increased weakness and hunger), 
then it is possible that the capacity for self-control operates on a 
preexisting metabolic system that alerts one to the threat of 
death. Thus, it is the same system that alerts one to the possibil- 
ity of physical death and that manages psychological thoughts 
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. 993
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of death. 
Work from evolutionary psychology suggests that people 
think and behave in ways functional to goal attainment, such as 
perceiving increased threat from others when afraid or in- 
creased sexual interest when sexually aroused (Maner, Gailliot, 
& DeWall, 2007; Maner et al., 2005). The current findings 
suggest a functional response concerning low glucose and mor- 
tality. When glucose is low, the individual is in a weaker, more 
vulnerable state, and thoughts of death might come to mind 
more readily. The thoughts of death function to increase the 
individual’s connection to culture, which facilitates survival. It 
is functional that, in a weakened state, thoughts of death might 
increase so as to mesh the individual in a stronger system that 
facilitates survival. 
Evolution is viewed mostly in terms of natural selection 
based on survival and reproduction. One underemphasized view 
is that natural selection operates in terms of energy (Gilliland, 
1978; Lotka, 1922; Odum, 1995). Organisms that acquire, use, 
and control larger amounts of energy tend to survive and re- 
produce, as will those that are more efficient. Organisms that do 
not maximize energy are selected against. Over time, species 
increase their capacity to process or control larger amounts of 
energy. People have evolved so as to be capable of sustaining 
and being part of a larger cultural system (Baumeister, 2005). 
Culture clearly is a high energy system, providing people with 
energy (e.g., oil, food) or energy-saving devices (e.g., machines 
for transportation, vaccines that aid in immune defense). It is 
fitting that people strengthen their ties to culture after mortality 
salience when their biological energy (glucose) is low. When 
personal energy is low, people seek a system that provides en- 
ergy, consistent with the idea that thoughts and behaviors have 
been naturally selected to promote the control of higher 
amounts of energy. 
Future work on the topic of glucose and mortality salience 
should examine what mediates the current effects. Theoretical 
and empirical arguments suggest that glucose reduces world- 
view defense after mortality salience because people are more 
effective at the self-controlled suppression of death-related 
thought, less threatened by death, or more distant from actual 
physical death. Any of these could potentially mediate the cur- 
rent effects. 
Humans are metabolic organisms. Life is a process of ac- 
quiring and using metabolic energy. To stop the metabolic flow 
is to end life, to reduce the metabolic flow is to tend closer to 
death. Likewise, when glucose is low, death might be more 
threatening in that people respond more defensively to mortal- 
ity reminders. This new perspective on the management of mor- 
tality concerns and metabolism raises numerous exciting ave- 
nues for future research. 
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